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Abstract
When faced with risky decisions, people tend to be risk averse for gains and risk seeking for losses (the reflection effect).
Studies examining this risk-sensitive decision making, however, typically ask people directly what they would do in
hypothetical choice scenarios. A recent flurry of studies has shown that when these risky decisions include rare outcomes,
people make different choices for explicitly described probabilities than for experienced probabilistic outcomes. Specifically,
rare outcomes are overweighted when described and underweighted when experienced. In two experiments, we examined
risk-sensitive decision making when the risky option had two equally probable (50%) outcomes. For experience-based
decisions, there was a reversal of the reflection effect with greater risk seeking for gains than for losses, as compared to
description-based decisions. This fundamental difference in experienced and described choices cannot be explained by the
weighting of rare events and suggests a separate subjective utility curve for experience.
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Introduction
How people evaluate risk and decide between risky alternatives
is a fundamental problem in decision making—one that should
perhaps take on renewed importance in light of the recent
financial crisis [1–3]. Risk sensitivity in humans is most commonly
evaluated by asking people to decide between explicitly described,
hypothetical choice scenarios [4–5]. Yet frequently in life, we
make repeated choices, and our knowledge about uncertain
outcomes is gleaned from experience, rather than from explicitly
described scenarios. Recently, researchers have begun to evaluate
risky choice based on experience, and several studies have
reported that experience-based choices may differ from choices
based on verbal descriptions. In particular, a description-experience gap
has been revealed in people’s sensitivity to rare outcomes [5–14].
When making decisions based on verbal descriptions, people
overweight rare events, but they underweight those rare events
when making decisions based on experience. In this paper, we
show how this difference between decisions from description and
experience extends beyond rare events, such as the proverbial
black swan, and occurs even for events that are equally probable,
such as tossing a coin.
When given a choice between explicitly described options,
people tend to be risk averse for gains and risk seeking for losses.
For example, when presented with a choice between a guaranteed
win of $100 or a 50/50 chance of winning $200, most people will
select the sure win and take the $100. Alternatively, if given a
choice between a sure loss of $100 or a 50/50 chance of losing
$200, most people will gamble and take the risky option. This shift
from risk aversion for gains to risk seeking for losses is known as
the reflection effect and is a foundational result in behavioral
economics [4,15–16]. This reflection effect is often interpreted,
within the guise of prospect theory, as reflecting an s-shaped utility
curve, whereby the subjective utility of gaining $200 is less than
twice as good as the subjective utility of gaining $100, and the
subjective utility of losing $200 is less than twice as bad as the
subjective utility of losing $100. As a result, people tend to avoid
the gamble in the gain case, but seek out the gamble in the loss
case. This asymmetry can arise even when the objective expected
value of both options in both choice settings is identical [4,16–19].
If, however, one of the two outcomes is comparatively ‘‘rare’’,
usually defined as less than 20% chance of occurrence, then a
different pattern of results emerges when people are asked to
decide based on their experiences [6,11]. For example, Hertwig
et al. [10] (Problems 1 and 4) presented people with a choice
between 100% chance at gaining $3 or an 80%/20% chance at
gaining $4/$0. The description group received a verbal description
of the contingencies. The experience group was allowed to
repeatedly sample from the different alternatives and get feedback
before making a single rewarded choice. They found that the
experience group chose the risky alternative much more often than
the description group (i.e., the experience group was more risk
seeking). In contrast, when the choice was changed to be between
losses, but keeping the amounts and probabilities the same, the
experience group chose the risky alternative much less often the
description group (i.e., the experience group was more risk averse).
These results are commonly interpreted as an underweighting of
the rare outcome in the experience-based decision process,
possibly due to estimation error or a recency bias [11]. These
results, however, hint at something even more fundamental:
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subjective utility is altered when people learn about risky
contingencies from experience. As a result, differences between
description- and experience-based decisions should appear even in
the absence of rare events. To evaluate this possibility, we designed
two experiments that examine decisions from experiences without
any rare outcomes, where the risky option always led to one of two
equiprobable (50%) outcomes.
In this pair of experiments, we demonstrate that the differences
between described and experienced risky choices are not limited to
rare events. We developed a novel task for decisions from
experience and description, wherein the same participants were
repeatedly tested for risky choice in both ways (Fig. 1). In the
experience conditions, participants chose between two colored doors
and then immediately gained or lost points. One door led to a
guaranteed win of 20 points, whereas a second door was followed
by a 50/50 chance of winning 0 or 40 points. The final two doors
used the same contingencies, but were followed by losses instead of
gains. In the description conditions, the same participants chose
between losing (or winning) a guaranteed number of points and a
gamble where they could lose (or win) twice as many points. No
immediate feedback was given on the outcome of this described
gamble. Based on traditional prospect theory, we would expect
risk aversion for gains and risk seeking for losses in both conditions.
If, however, decision making from experience does not conform to
prospect theory, even in the absence of rare events, then we would
expect a difference between the experience and description
conditions.
In this first experiment, experience-based choices always
produced immediate feedback, and described choices never
resulted in immediate feedback, perhaps leading to differential
emotional states during the experienced and described choices. A
second experiment controlled for the possibility that participants
may have been in a more emotionally aroused or ‘‘hot’’ state
during the experience-based choices. Risky decision making has
been shown to vary in emotional states [23–24], suggesting that
perhaps any differences between experience and description may
arise from differential engagement of emotional and cognitive
systems [25]. The second experiment was designed to eliminate
the possibility that participants were in a different ‘‘hot’’ state
during the experienced trials. The experiment started with a
separate training period during which participants learned the
contingencies between the doors and potential outcomes. All
subsequent testing for both experienced and described trials was
conducted without any further feedback. In addition, all test runs
contained both a block of experienced trials and a block of
described trials. These two changes should help ensure similar
emotional states during the test period.
Methods
Experiment 1: Partial Feedback
Participants. A total of 62 participants were divided into 2
groups: 34 in Group 1 and 28 in Group 2. All participants were
University of Alberta undergraduate students, who participated
for course credit. Participants were tested in squads of 2–4
people. Written informed consent was obtained from all
participants after the objectives and risks of the study were
explained, and all procedures were approved by the Arts,
Science, & Law Research Ethics Board (ASL REB) at the
University of Alberta. Data from 6 participants were removed
due to poor performance on catch trials (see Results for details).
The remaining participants consisted of 35 females and 21 males,
with a mean age of 20 (range of 18 to 39).
Procedure. Figure 1 schematically depicts the procedure on
the two types of trials in the experiment. On the experienced trials,
participants had to click a door, which was immediately followed
by feedback. There were 4 different-coloured doors in the
experiment. On some trials there were 2 doors to choose from
(choice trials), and, on other trials, there was only 1 door that had
to be selected to continue (single-option trials). The feedback lasted
1200 ms and consisted of the number of points gained or lost
along with a little graphic; for gains, a pot of gold was displayed,
and for losses, a robber was displayed. On the bottom of the
screen, a running tally of the points earned thus far was displayed.
Each door led to a different outcome: a fixed gain (+20), risky gain
(+0o r+40 with 50% probability), fixed loss (220), or risky loss (20
or 240 with 50% probability).
Experienced trials were presented in 3 runs of 56 trials that were
each divided among 3 basic types: 32 choice trials between the two
different gains or the two different losses (16 of each), 16 catch
trials with one gain option and one loss option, and 8 single-option
trials where only one door was presented and had to be selected.
The ordering of these trials within a run was randomized for each
run. These numbers were selected so that each door would appear
equally often on both sides of the screen and in combination with
the other doors. Both the 32 regular choice trials and the 8 single-
option trials in each run were equally divided between gain trials
and loss trials, and thus had an expected value of 0. The 16 catch
trials were the only trials on which participants could earn a net
gain of points and served to ensure that participants paid attention
to their choices.
An additional block of 24 single-option trials (16 gain and 8 loss)
immediately preceded the very first run. These extra single-option
trials ensured that the participants initially encountered exactly the
planned distribution of outcomes for the different doors. In these
single-option trials, each of the 4 doors appeared 4–8 times in a
randomorder.Fortheriskydoors,the outcomesconsisted ofexactly
half wins and half losses on those first few trials, ensured by random
selection (without replacement) from a pool of outcomes for each
door.Asaresult,therewasaguaranteed 50/50distributionoverthe
first few exposuresto the door. The order was randomly determined
for each participant. Note the fixed number of choice and single-
option trials: Participants did not get to choose how many samples
they encountered before making a decision, in contrast to the
common procedure for examining experience-based decision
making [10]. The two groups of participants differed primarily in
that door color was counterbalanced across groups.
On the described trials, two options were presented on the
screen separated by the word ‘‘or’’. One side of the screen showed
a fixed option and presented either the words ‘‘Win 20’’ or the
words ‘‘Lose 20’’. The other side of the screen showed a risky
option and presented a pie chart with the word ‘‘Gamble’’ written
in the middle. The pie chart was half red and half green (see
Figure 1). For the risky loss option, the two halves of the pie chart
corresponded to ‘‘Lose 40’’ (red) and ‘‘Lose 0’’ (green). For the
risky gain option, the two halves of the pie chart corresponded to
‘‘Win 40’’ (green) and ‘‘Win 0’’ (red). The design of the described
trials was inspired by the method of [20]. The described trials were
presented in 2 runs of 48 trials divided among 2 basic types: 32
choice trials between the two different gains or the two different
losses (16 of each) and 16 catch trials with one gain option and one
loss option. For Group 2, there were 20 catch trials, including ones
between two gains or losses of different objective values (e.g., ‘‘Win
10’’ vs. 50/50 chance of ‘‘Win 40’’ or ‘‘Win 0’’). Participants were
advised in advance that no feedback would be given during these
runs, and the running tally did not appear on the bottom of the
screen.
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about 6–7 minutes each. The first, third, and fifth runs consisted
exclusively of experience-based decisions, whereas the second and
fourth runs consisted exclusively of description-based decisions.
Due to a computer error, 3 participants in Group 1 missed the first
experience run and only received the final two experience runs.
Runs were separated by a riddle for entertainment and a brief rest
period. To enhance motivation to perform the task, a list of
anonymous high scores was posted on the blackboard, and
participants were encouraged to try to beat the scores. All trials
were counterbalanced for side so that each option appeared
equally often on either side of the screen. An inter-trial interval of
2.5–3.5 s separated all trials. Stimuli were presented and the data
recorded with E-prime 1.0 (Psychology Software Tools, Inc.;
Pittsburgh, PA).
Data Analysis. Two primary dependent measures were used.
To compare performance for gains and losses, gambling quotients
were calculated as the probability of choosing the risky option.
Only data from the final run were used to compare the described
and experienced cases to exclude any potential changes across
runs due to learning. A preliminary three-way ANOVA on
gambling quotients with group as a between-subjects factor
indicated no effect of group, nor any significant interactions, and
thus the two groups were collapsed for all analyses. Gambling
quotients were then compared using a two-way (condition and
choice type), repeated-measures ANOVA, followed by pairwise
comparisons. Corrections for multiple pairwise comparisons were
performed with the Holm-Sidak iterative method. To measure the
strength of the reflection effect, we calculated reflection scores that
were the difference between the gambling quotients for losses and
gains. These reflection scores were compared across description
and experience using a paired t-test. Effect sizes were calculated as
Cohen’s d for t tests and partial eta-squared (g
2
p) for ANOVAs
[21–22]. Inferential statistics were calculated using SigmaPlot 11
(Systat Software, Inc.; San Jose, CA), SPSS 18 (SPSS, Inc.;
Chicago, IL), and MATLAB (The Mathworks Inc.; Natick, MA).
Experiment 2: No Feedback
Participants. Twenty-eight new participants from the same
student population were run in Experiment 2. One participant
scored less than 60% on the experienced catch trials; data from
this participant have been removed from all analyses. The
remaining participants consisted of 24 females and 3 males, with
a mean age of 24 (range of 18 to 44).
Procedure. The basic procedure on each trial was identical
to Experiment 1. The biggest difference from Experiment 1 was
Figure 1. Schematic of the method used in the experiments. (A) On experience-based choice trials, participants were faced with a choice
between two of four possible colored doors. Two doors always led to losses, and the other two always led to gains. Their choice was immediately
followed by a gain or loss of a fixed or variable number of points throughout Experiment 1 and during the pre-training trials only in Experiment 2. (B)
On description-based choice trials, participants were presented with verbal and pictorial descriptions of different choices between fixed or variable
number of points. No feedback was given until all trials in a run were complete to prevent participants from learning from their experience.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0020262.g001
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period with feedback and a test period with no feedback. The pre-
training period began with 32 single-option trials (8 with each
door) and then an additional 104 trials (32 single option, 48 choice,
and 24 catch trials in a random order), all followed immediately by
rewarding feedback. After a riddle and a brief break, participants
were then exposed to 8 sample described trials to familiarize them
with the procedure. There were then 6 additional runs that mixed
experienced and described trials, all with no feedback. Each run
had one block of 24 described trials (33% gain, 33% loss, 33%
catch) and another block of 25 experienced trials (40% gain, 40%
loss, 20% catch), presented in a counterbalanced order across
runs. Unlike Experiment 1, the running total on the bottom of the
screen and tally of high scores on the chalkboard in the room were
not present. At the end of the experiment, subjects were presented
with a questionnaire that asked them what they had learned about
the different doors. Data analysis proceeded as in Experiment 1,
except all 6 non-feedback runs were used to compare the described
and experienced trials.
Results
Experiment 1: Partial Feedback
Contrary to the prediction of prospect theory, we found a
reversal of the reflection effect for the experienced problems, even
with equiprobable outcomes in Experiment 1. Figure 2A shows
how people gambled more for gains than losses when the
outcomes were learned from experience, but not when they were
described. The reflection scores, calculated as the probability of
gambling on loss trials minus the probability of gambling on gain
trials, were significantly higher on described trials than on
experienced trials (t(55) =4.45, p,.001, d=.60). The reflection
scores for experience-based decisions trended downward across
trials (see Fig. 2B), indicating that this reversal became more
established as the relationships between cues and rewards were
learned more accurately, although the visible downward trend was
not statistically reliable (F(2,106) =1.98, p=.14, g
2
p=.04).
Figure 2C shows that this difference between the experienced
and described trials represents a full reversal of the reflection effect
(condition 6 choice type interaction, F(1,55) =19.9, p,.001,
g
2
p=.27). On gain trials, participants flipped from risk aversion on
described problems to risk seeking on experienced problems. On
loss trials, participants flipped from risk seeking on described
problems to risk aversion on experienced problems (p,.031 for all
pairwise comparisons).
Figure 2D depicts mean performance on the experienced catch
trials across the three experience runs of the experiment. Six
participants scored less than 60% correct on these catch trials (4 in
Group 1 and 2 in Group 2); data from these participants have
been removed from all analyses. For the remaining 54 participants
that received all 3 training runs, performance was high
throughout, but improved slightly across the runs (F(2,106)
=14.99, p,.01, g
2
p=.22). In the final run, on which the primary
comparisons between described and experienced trials are based,
mean performance on catch trials was 97.6% correct. Across the
whole experiment, the empirical probabilities of receiving the
better outcome on the risky option were 51.66.8% and
50.361.2% for gain and loss trials respectively, which were not
statistically different than 50%, nor from each other (all ps..05).
Experiment 2: No Feedback
As in Experiment 1, people again gambled more for gains than
losses when these contingencies were learned from experience, but
not when they were described, even when immediate feedback was
no longer being provided about the experience-based choices.
Figure 3A depicts how the reflection scores were significantly
lower in the experienced trials, (t(26) =2.79, p,.01, d=.54).
These reflection scores were consistent across the 6 non-feedback
runs for both experienced and described trials, as shown in
Figure 3B. A two-way ANOVA confirmed a main effect of trial
type (F(1,27) =7.83; p,.01, g
2
p=.23), but no effect of run, nor
any interaction (both ps..25). The difference between experienced
and described trials was present for both gains and losses. As
depicted in Figure 3C, when choosing between gains, participants
gambled more in the experienced case, and when choosing
between losses, participants gambled more in the described case
(condition 6 choice type interaction, F(1,26) =7.82; p=.01,
g
2
p=.23; both pairwise comparisons, p,.038). In addition, there
was a significant reversal of the reflection effect for the experienced
trials (p,.01); however, the reflection effect for the described
condition failed to reach significance (p..05). Finally, performance
on the catch trials was high throughout, even peaking at 100%
correct on the 5
th run (see Fig. 3D).
Discussion
In a pair of experiments, we show that the classic reflection
effect from behavioral economics is reversed when participants
learn the reward contingencies from experience. These results
significantly extend the recent discovery of a description-
experience gap in the assessment of rare events [5–14]. For the
variable options in our experiments, both outcomes were
equiprobable, meaning that neither event was more rare than
the other. Despite this elimination of rare events from the
experiment, we still found a profound difference between people’s
risky choices in described and experienced cases. This finding
suggests that the description-experience gap is more general than
previously thought and cannot be solely explained by an
overweighting of rare events [11]. Moreover, by using a within-
subject design, our study is one of few studies to show differences
between experience and description in the very same participants
[7–13]. Our novel finding demonstrates a serious limitation to
current theories of risky choice in behavioral economics, which are
mostly based on described choices [4–5].
In prospect theory, the subjective utility curve grows sub-
linearly, leaving extreme values proportionally underweighted
[4,16]. That is, a reward that is objectively twice as large (e.g.,
$200 vs. $100) is perceived as subjectively less than twice as big. In
contrast, our results suggest that the subjective utility curve based
on experienced outcomes may overweight extreme values,
growing perhaps supra-linearly (i.e., faster than linear). Thus,
extreme values (big wins or big losses) carry proportionally more
weight in decisions based on experience, leading to risk seeking for
gains and risk aversion for losses. This extrema hypothesis supposes
that, in the experienced case, the largest and smallest rewards in a
given context are given undue importance in the decision-making
process. One possibility is that people remember the big wins and
the big losses best, and, as a result, their decision making is swayed
by those extreme outcomes, perhaps through an affect [26] or
availability heuristic [27]. In our experiments, this memory bias
towards extreme values would result in gambling for gains and risk
aversion for losses, but only when the outcomes were learned from
experience (as seen in Figs. 2 and 3).
The somatic marker hypothesis also provides a potential
mechanism for this weighting scheme that gives a disproportion-
ately large weight to extreme values [28–29]. This hypothesis
contends that emotional, bodily reactions to rewarding events
drive subsequent decision making. Larger rewards (good or bad)
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responses, driving subsequent decision-making, but only in the
experienced, retrospective case. We did not, however, record any
physiological measures as a proxy for emotional reactions and thus
cannot definitely claim that the extreme values were indeed more
emotionally salient. An extended range of values beyond those
presented here would also help formulate a hypothesis as to exactly
what function might describe this experience-based weighting.
In a recent review, Hertwig and Erev [11] proposed several
psychological mechanisms that might account for the description-
experience gap for rare events. Our finding that this gap can
extend to equally probable outcomes suggests that some of these
mechanisms are insufficient for explaining the differences between
description and experience. For example, our results cannot easily
be accounted for by limited sample sizes or estimation errors of the
rate of occurrence of rare events. Indeed, the programmed and
received outcomes for the risky outcomes always hovered near
50% in our experiment. In addition, the single-option trials
ensured that all participants received both possible outcomes
several times for both risky options, and many of our participants
correctly identified the exact 50/50 probability in the post-
experiment questionnaire. As compared to many other studies of
decisions from experience [10,13], our participants received more
experience with the different options (.100 trials total as opposed
to the usual 10–20) further limiting the possibility that a sampling
bias could explain the results. This extensive training, however,
raises a different concern in that our results only seemed to emerge
after significant training with the experience-based options (see
Fig. 2B). We do not know yet whether our results will generalize to
other procedures for examining experience-based decisions that
rely on fewer exposures to the potential outcomes.
A second possibility that Hertwig and Erev [11] suggest for
explaining the description-experience gap with rare events is that
recent events might carry more weight in the decision process,
again biasing the weight toward the more frequently occurring
outcome. In our experiments, however, there were no rare events,
therefore neither the positive nor the negative outcome for the
risky option should have received consistently increased weighting.
Moreover, the results from Experiment 2, which explicitly
separated the learning phase with feedback from the experience-
based test trials, provide further evidence against this recency
hypothesis.
Figure 2. Results from Experiment 1. (A). Reflection scores as a function of experimental condition. Participants displayed reliably higher
reflection scores for described vs. experienced problems (p,.001). (B). Reflection scores on experienced trials as a function of block in the experiment.
There was a trend toward a greater reverse reflection effect as the potential outcomes were learned. (C). Gambling quotient as a function of
experimental condition and choice type. For gains, participants were risk seeking for experienced problems, but risk averse for described problems.I n
contrast, for losses, participants were risk averse in experienced problems, but risk seeking in described problems. * = p,.05. (D). Percentage correct
on catch trials as a function of experience training block. Performance increased across blocks, but was high throughout, peaking at 97.6% on the
final training block.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0020262.g002
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experienced problems is that the probabilities of the various
outcomes are known with certainty in the described problems, but
start off uncertain or ambiguous for the experienced problems
[30–31]. Thus, to the extent that participants have not learned the
relationship between the stimuli and rewards, the experienced task
incorporates elements of ambiguity. The trend towards increas-
ingly negative reflection scores across the different blocks in Exp. 1
(Fig. 2D), however, suggests that ambiguity does not underlie the
reversed reflection effect. As the contingencies are learned (see
Fig. 2B) and the ambiguity in the experienced problems is
attenuated, the difference between the experienced and described
problems does not disappear. Indeed, the difference between
experienced and described problems is most robust on the final
experience run, after the contingencies are well learned (Fig. 2A
and 2C).
Our findings suggest an alternate interpretation of the role of
ambiguity in other tasks that involve ambiguous outcome
probabilities, such as the Iowa Gambling Task. The Iowa
Gambling task engages emotional processes to a greater extent
than tasks with stated probabilities [28–29,32–33]. This enhanced
emotional engagement has been attributed to ambiguous decisions
in those tasks. We suggest that the emotional engagement might
instead derive from the fact that the outcomes for those ambiguous
decisions are learned from experience.
Our results strongly reinforce the finding that patterns of human
decision-making under uncertainty depend on how the decision
problem is posed, as is often found in many areas of psychology
[19,34,35,36]. The canonical reflection effect can be reversed
when participants learn the probabilities from experienced
outcomes, even for moderate probabilities, indicating that how
we decide may be fundamentally different when we think about
the future (in described cases) than when we reflect on the past (in
experienced cases). When considering future possibilities, we may
underweight extreme outcomes, as per prospect theory, leading to
the canonical reflection effect. When remembering past outcomes,
we may be driven by the emotional, somatic effects of the more
extreme values and overweight those outcomes in our decision
making for risky outcomes, leading to a reversal of the usual
reflection effect. This dichotomy between prospective and
retrospective modes of evaluation suggests a fundamental
extension to theories of risky choice.
Figure 3. Results from Experiment 2. (A). Reflection scores as a function of experimental condition. Participants displayed reliably higher
reflection scores for described vs. experienced problems (p,.001). (B). Reflection scores on experienced and described trials as a function of block in
the experiment. On each block, reflection scores were higher for described than for experienced trials. PT = pre-training for the experienced trials,
where feedback was obtained after each trial. (C). Gambling quotient as a function of experimental condition and choice type. For gains, participants
were risk seeking for experienced problems, but risk averse for described problems. In contrast, for losses, participants were risk averse in experienced
problems, but nominally risk seeking in described problems. * = p,.05. (D). Percentage correct on catch trials as a function of experience training
block. Performance was relatively stable across test blocks, peaking at 100% on test block 5.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0020262.g003
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